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ARGUMENT IN REPLY ON CROSS-APPEAL 
The District Court Erred When, After Withdrawing Beavers' Admission, It Failed 
To Reinstate The Parties To The Status Quo Prior To the Admission Having 
Been Made 
A. Introduction 
At Beavers' sentencing, the district court determined that Beavers' 
admission to a sentencing enhancement was not entered knowingly. In its 
cross-appeal, the state asserted that the district court erred when it proceeded to 
sentence Beavers as if the state had never charged the enhancement rather 
than returning the parties to the status quo prior to the admission. 
(Respondent's Brief, pp. 37-45.) The state further asserted that the district court 
abused its sentencing discretion when it decided that, even if Beavers had been 
properly advised of the enhancement, that it still would not apply the 
enhancement. (Id.) Beavers argues in response that this issue was never 
raised in, or decided by, the district court and thus it is not properly before this 
court. (Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 32-33.) Beavers further asserts that the 
district court was correct in not applying the sentencing enhancement and, even 
if it erred in its failure to apply the enhancement, that such error was harmless . 
(Appellant's Reply Brief, pp. 34-37.) 
Beavers' arguments are unavailing because the issue was squarely 
before the district court and, resultingly, preserved for appeal. Further, the 
district court abused its discretion when it decided that it would not apply the 





















assertion on appeal, the district court's error in failing to apply the sentencing 
enhancement as required by law was not harmless error. 
8. The State's Argument That The Parties Should Have Been Returned To 
The Status Quo Ante Following The Withdrawal Of Beavers' Admission 
To The Enhancement Is Properly Before This Court 
Beavers asserts that the state failed to raise the issue of whether the 
parties should be returned to the status quo ante before the district court and 
thus, it is not preserved for appeal. (Reply brief, p. 32-33.) Beavers' assertion is 
without merit. It is well settled that the appellate court "will not 'review a trial 
court's alleged error on appeal unless the record discloses an adverse ruling 
which forms the basis for an assignment of error."' State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 
378, 384, 987 P.2d 290, 296 (1999) (quoting State v. Fisher, 123 Idaho 481, 
485, 849 P.2d 942, 946 (1993)). Because the record contains an adverse ruling, 
the state may challenge that ruling on appeal. 
Here, by refusing to apply the enhancement and treating it as if it didn't 
exist, the court undoubtedly decided the issue and made an adverse ruling 
against the state. Both parties submitted sentencing briefs prior to Beavers' 
sentencing, explaining how they believed the enhancements should apply (R., 
vol. 111, pp. 664-66, 667-71 ), and the application of the sentencing enhancement 
was extensively discussed at Beavers' sentencing hearing (see generally, Tr., 
vol. I, p. 997, L. 5 - p. 1025, L. 11 ). The state later filed a Rule 35 motion to 
correct an illegal sentence for the court's failure to apply the enhancement (R., 
vol. Ill, pp. 693-96), which was denied (R., vol. 111, pp. 706-14). Because the 

















court, and because the trial court decided that it would not apply the 
enhancement, the consequence of the district court's refusal to apply the 
enhancement is an issue preserved for appellate review. 1 
C. The District Court Erred When It Decided That Sentencing Goals Had 
Been Met And So It Would Not Apply The Enhancement 
The state asserted in its opening brief that the district court abused its 
discretion when it determined that, even if Beavers' plea to the enhancement 
had been voluntary, it still would not apply the enhancement because it had met 
the goals of sentencing without regard to the enhancement. (Respondent's brief, 
p. 41.) For purposes of this appeal, the state does not dispute the district court's 
finding that Beavers' admission was not knowing. (See Respondent's brief, p. 
38). The state is not asking that the district court apply the enhancement in 
violation of Beavers' due process rights but, rather, that upon returning the 
parties to the status quo ante, and if Beavers is convicted of the enhancement, 
that the district court be ordered to apply the enhancement despite its previous 
finding that the goals of sentencing could be met without regard to the 
enhancement. 
This situation is most analogous to that where a defendant is permitted to 
withdraw his plea for failure to be properly advised of his rights and the charges 
against him. In that situation, the remedy is not to dismiss the charge outright 
but, rather, to reinstate the parties to the status quo ante. See State v . 
1 If Beavers is taking the position that the district court's ruling does not bar it 
from pursuing the enhancement the state is willing to so stipulate and request 





















Henderson, 113 Idaho 411, 414, 7 44 P .2d 795, 798 (Ct. App. 1987) (upon 
withdrawal of guilty plea, parties returned to previous status and state permitted 
to re-file charges dismissed pursuant to plea agreement). Likewise, here, the 
parties should be returned to their previous status. 
As previously discussed in Respondent's Brief, the application of 
sentencing enhancements is mandatory and the district court abused its 
discretion when it ruled that it would not apply the enhancement even if Beavers 
had entered a proper plea to the enhancement. (Respondent's brief, pp. 41-43.) 
On remand, if Beavers is found guilty after trial or admits the enhancement, the 
state requests that the district court be ordered to apply the enhancement. 
Beavers' asserts that "the fact is that the district court made it clear that if 
it were forced to apply the sentencing enhancement at issue, it still would have 
structured Mr. Beavers' sentences in such a way as to arrive at the aggregate 
sentence ultimately imposed in this case - twelve years with three years fixed." 
(Reply Brief, p. 36.) Thus, he argues, any error is harmless. (Id.) However, the 
district court's refusal to apply the enhancement is not harmless error. As 
discussed in Respondent's Brief, the enhancement, I.C. § 37-2732(a), requires a 
minimum three-year fixed term be imposed on all second-time drug traffickers 
and that it run consecutive to any other sentence imposed by the court. 
(Respondent's brief, pp. 43-45.) Beavers was convicted of two other crimes in 
the Second Case and three crimes in the First Case. (R., vol. 111, pp. 562-64; pp. 
655-56.) These other sentences were imposed at the same time as his 





















the plain language of the statute, the three year minimum sentence on the 
delivery charge must run consecutive to these other sentences. As a result, 
Beavers' fixed period of incarceration would increase from three years to six 
years. 
Beavers contends that the district court could reach the same aggregate 
sentence (twelve years with three years fixed) by imposing a three-year fixed 
sentence on the delivery conviction in the Second Case, consecutive to fully 
indeterminate sentences on the other convictions in the Second Case, and 
concurrently with all of the sentences in the First Case. (Reply brief, p. 36, 
n.11.) This argument, however, ignores that Beavers' trafficking conviction in 
the Second Case requires a two-year minimum fixed sentence. I.C. § 37-
2732(B)(a)(7). (See R., vol. Ill, p. 681-82.) Thus, even if this court decides that 
the sentence for Beavers' delivery conviction in the Second Case does not need 
to run concurrent to his sentences in the First Case, he still must receive a 
minimum five-year fixed sentence in the Second Case (two-years fixed on the 
trafficking conviction followed by three-years fixed on the enhanced delivery 
conviction). 
For these reasons, Beavers' argument that the district court's error in 
refusing to apply the enhancement even if Beavers were properly found guilty of 

























The state respectfully requests that this Court vacate Mark Beavers' 
sentences and that the case be remanded so that a jury can decide whether I.C. 
§ 37-2739A applies. 
DATED this 14th day of July 2010. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 14th day of July 2010, I served a true 
and correct copy of the RESPONDENT'S REPLY ON CROSS-APPEAL by 
causing a copy addressed to: 
ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in the State Appellate Public Defender's basket iocated in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office 
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